Abstract: During the ongoing post-communist economic transitions, the relative well-being of many people is changing rapidly, and governments are not well positioned to accurately measure individual living standards. Under such circumstances, continued price controls over basic consumer goods within the state sector, and the associated queuing, can form a serviceable device for targeting poor people for subsidies. With a fixedprice state sector and free-price parallel markets, rich people might choose to avoid queues and shop in the free markets, while poor people would prefer to pay low nominal prices and queue in the state sector. The targeting of subsidies through queues, therefore, can be accomplished even if the government has no information on individual income or living standards. When the alternative to price controls is a poorly targeted explicit social safety net, the resource cost of queues might be more than compensated for by an improvement in the targeting of subsidies.
As the size of the tax T increases, two limitations must be taken into account. The first is that, for T sufficiently large, the constraint that poor people work a non-negative number of hours becomes binding.
Second, at some point T is so large that the taxed rich are made worse off than the subsidized poor. In practice, however, the incentive to work productively would be undermined by such a severe redistribution scheme. At such tax rates, those rich who cannot hide their income (i.e., who are identifiable as rich) would be expected to pool with the poor in terms of their productivity: the disincentive to work productively at high tax rates implies that the marginal product w r would not be sustained by productive but highly taxed workers. Further, once the taxed rich are no better off than the subsidized poor, increases in T will increase inequality.
Simulations and Analysis
In this section, we explore some of the properties of the model 12. Barzel (1974) indicates two factors that make it likely that the poor will be those who acquire goods distributed via price controls and queuing: (1) a high price elasticity of demand and (2) a low income elasticity. He goes on to suggest that those conditions are likely to be met in the case of consumer necessities for which close substitutes are available in free-price, parallel markets.
13. Price controls in socialist societies frequently were accompanied by strict limits on the amount of a good that a single individual could purchase once the front of the queue was reached. In the long run, desired purchases could be large relative to the limit allowed, and waiting time would be roughly proportional to the quantity purchased. For a discussion, see Stahl and Alexeev (1986, p. 236). Weitzman (1991) provides an inventory model that makes the alternative assumption that waiting time is independent of the quantity purchased.
14. Numerical simulations with equilibrium queue times above the minimum (but still low enough for a fully separating equilibrium) also were investigated, with qualitatively similar results. The derivation of the expression for P* and the simulations were carried out using MAPLE ® V software.
15. Alternatively, it could be assumed that the state produces the entire output of the good at the same cost as in the no intervention case, selling some of the output at a low fixed price and the rest at a free market price. A combination of state and private production is another possibility. In the economies in transition, taxing the sales and profits of a relatively few producers may be considerably easier and politically more acceptable than taxing the incomes of a large number of individuals. In Russia, for example, individual income tax collections (2.2% of GDP in 1995) have been dwarfed by the total amount collected from the enterprise profits tax, VAT, and excise taxes (14.3% of GDP in 1995). Russian Economic Trends, p. 17.
16. Alternatively, it could be assumed that poor people also will be miscategorized occasionally as being rich. Such an alteration would increase the attractiveness of price controls relative to targeting.
17. If instead of a lump-sum tax, workers are taxed a percentage of their earnings, then the taxed individuals no longer increase their labor supply. Simulations conducted using a proportional tax scheme produced results similar in qualitative terms to those reported in section 3 using lump-sum taxes.
18. The qualitative properties displayed in graphs 1a and 1b are reproduced if it is the comparative utility of only the poor people--as opposed to total social welfare--under the two regimes that is examined.
19. Leitzel (1998) examines the distributional impact of price liberalization when price-controlled goods are diverted from the state to the private sector. Vishny (1992, 1993 ) also look at the effects of rent-seeking in the presence of price controls.
20. There is some evidence that such a snowballing of controls led to the Soviet planned economy in the first instance. See the discussion and references in Leitzel (1995, pp. 6-7).
